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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOGAN F. CARR, individually, and 
LOGAN F. CARR, as Guardian Ad 




P ANY, A Utah Corporation, and 
COLLINS ROWLEY, 
Def endants-Respo-ndents, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 
11774 
This is an action for personal injuries arising out of 
the collision between a bicycle and an automobile; the 
minor plaintiff was riding the bicycle which collided 
with an automobile owned by defendant, Bradshaw Chev-
rolet Company, and driven by Collins Rowley. Collins 
Rowley was not served with process and is not before 
the Court at this time. Logan F. Carr brings this action 
as Guar<lian Ad Litem for the minor, Jeff L. Carr, to 
recover damages for personal injuries. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendant motioned for summary judgment con-
tending that .Jeff L. Carr was contributorily negligent as 
a matter of law. The trial court found in fav:o·r of defen-
dant and dismi•ssed the complaint of plaintiffs with 
prejudice, upon the merits. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks an affirmance of the trial court's 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent can only agree in part with the state-
ment of facts set forth in the brief of appellant since a 
number of the facts recited either go beyond the record 
or are not supported thereby. For this reason we deem 
it proper to formulate a statement of facts which we 
believe to be supported by the record. In developing ) 
the facts respondent is mindful of the rule that for pur-
poses of this appeal we must view the facts in a light 
most fav-orable to the plaintiff, though we may deny the 
validity ·of those facts. 
On September 5, 1964, at approximately 10 :00 
A.M., Jeff L. Carr, an eleven year eight-month old boy, 
left his home to ride his hicycle to downtown Cedar 
City for the purpose of purchasing school supplies. It 
was a clear day. There was no snow, rain, or ice on the 
sidewalk. (Deposition of Jeff L. Carr, P. 7.) The bicycle 
he had been riding had been a gift from his parents some 
six months before (Deposition of Jeff L. Carr, P. 3) 
and was considered a ''racing bike'' which possessed a 
gear mechanism, narrow tires, and brakes controlled 
from the handle bars. (Deposition of Jeff L. Carr, P. 4). 
Due to an order given by the Cedar City Chief of 
Police during an addres·s at Jeff's school advising bicycle 
riders to not ride on Cedar City's Main Street, Jeff 
turned onto Cedar City's Main Street sidewalk, three 
2 
blocks south of the scene of the accident. (Deposition oi 
,Jeff L. Carr, P. 6 and 7). He then proceeded at a "fairly" 
or "moderately'' fast rate of speed. (Deposition of ,Jeff 
L. Carr, P. 12.) 
At the time of this accident there existed on Cedar 
City's .Main Street a parking lot known as .Sullivan's 
parking lot, which 11ot Jeff Carr was aware of (Deposi-
tion of Jeff L. Carr, P. 8) as he proceeded along the 
sidewalk. 
As Jeff rode down the sidewalk, Collins N. Rowley 
and Byron Keith Anderson were preparing to leave 
Sullivan's parking lot. Collins Rowley was the driver 
and after backing the car from its parking place pulled 
forward to the parking l>ot entrance in order to enter 
the Main Street traffic. (Affidavit of Collins N. Rowley.) 
In order for an automobile to enter Main Street, it was 
necessary that the automcbile first cross the sidewalk 
aml then enter the traffic. (Affidavit of Collins N. Row-
ley.) There was a house s1outh of the lot with a four 
foot high wall which, combined with a hedge at the south 
of the parking lot, obstructed Mr. Rowley's view to the 
left. (Affidavit of Collins N. Rowley, Deposition of 
Byron K. Andersion, P. 13.) Because of the obstruction 
to his view, Mr. Rowley eased the car out so that he 
<·culd see past the bushes and the wall and observed no 
one on a bicycle but did see two automobiles coming 
north on :..Iain Street. (Affidavit of OoUins N. Rowley.) 
He then pulled across the sidewalk, blccking it, and 
stopped in order to wait for the traffic to clear. (Depo-
3 
sition of Byron K. Anderson, P. 9 and 15.) Neither Mr 1 
Rowley nor Mr. Anders1on saw anyone coming from 
either direction on a bicycle. (Deposition of Byron K. 
Anderson, P. 16, 17, Affidavit of Collins N. Rowley.) 
The car was stopped across the sidewalk ''a good ten 
seconds" to allow the traffic to clear, (Deposition of 
Byron K. Anderson, P. 17) and at that pcint Jeff L. 
Carr collided with the automobile. 
Prior to the impact, Jeff had been glancing down 
periodically at the sidewalk to avoid rough spots; (Affi-
davit of Jeff L. Carr) and yet he did not see the car 
back out of its parking place, start from the parking 
lot toward the sidewalk, begin to cross the sidewalk and 
in fact did not see the car until it was stopped in the 
center of and across the sidewalk and had been stopped 
for some time. (Depo,sition of Jeff L. Carr, P. 9, 10, 11 
and 26.) It appears that Jeff L. Carr did not see the car 
until moments before he eollided with it. (Deposition of 
Jeff L. Carr, P. 9.) His testimony indicated that he had 
''glanced down or something'' and when he glanced up 
and saw the car he was unable to stop even after apply-
ing his brakes and thus collided with the parked car. 
(Deposition of Jeff L. Carr, P.10 and 11.) 
At the time of the accident, Jeff Carr was a good 
student, (Deposition 10.f Jeff L. Carr, P. 24) athletic and 
independent. (Depositicn of Jeff L. Carr, P. 22, 22A.) 
It is clear that the District Court was fully cognizant 
of the facts of the case and analyzed those facts in depth 
in reaehing its decision. 
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In the Memorandum Decision it was noted at page 
2, paragraph 7 that: 
''While the said Jeff L. Carr was not an adult 
at the time of this incident and therefore could 
not he expected to have the maturity or judgment 
of Etn adult, yet, the court believes and finds that 
where a straight "A" student almost twelve 
years old who had been active in a variety of 
athletic activities drove his bicycle down the side-
walk and directly into a four-dcor sedan automo-
bile which was parked across the sidewalk so as 
to bfock the same, such bicycle rider is negligent 
in failing to keep a proper lookout, in going toio 
fast for existing conditions where he knew the 
parking place and driveway existed, and in failing 
to keep his vehicle under control.'' 
The court further held at page 2, paragraph 6 of the 
.Memorandum Decisi'On that: 
''From the record in this case including the 
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions 
on file, the court finds that there is no genuine 
issue as to any materral fact and that the said 
.T eff L. Carr wa·s negligent at the time and place 
of this incident, which negligence proximately 
contributed to his injuries and is thereby pre-




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETER-
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE CAPACITY 
AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PLAIN-
TIFF, AN ELEVEN YEAR EIGHT-MONTH OLD 
5 
BOY, UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, 
DEFENDANT -\YAS ENTITLED TO A SUMi\TARY 
JUDGMENT. 
In Welchman v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 25, 337 P. 2d 410 
(1959), the Utah Supreme Court nofod that summary 
judgment i 1s a drastic remedy and respondent is in agree-
ment with that conclusion. It should only be used -when 
under the facts viewed in a light most favorable to 
plaintiff he could not recover as a matter of law. 
That decision did not state, however, that such 
remedy should be unjustly withheld and that simply 
because a plain tiff claims injury he sh c uld be allowed 
recovery. If defendant ·can illustrate that under the facts 
of this ca1se plaintiff was negligent, thereby proximately 
causing his ovvn injuries and that in regard to those 
facts reasonable men could not differ as to their eon-
clusi•on based on those facts, then defendant is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. 
The Fifth Judicial District Court was so convinced 
and thus withheld the determination from jury consid-
eration. 
·with regard to the facts of this case, plaintiff 
relies heavily on Nelson et ux v. Arrowhead Freigl1t 
Lines, 99 Utah 129, 104 P. 2d 225 (1940), for the propo-
that where a child is under fourteen years of age, 
there is a presumption that such child is incapable of 
c·ntributory negligence. 
In commenting on that (·onclusion in Mann v. Fair-
6 
/Juurn, 12 Utah 2d 342, 366 P. 2d 603 (1961), this Court 
pointed out that such an arbitrary statement wa,s mere 
dicta in the A rroichead case ''inasmuch as the plaintiffs 
in that case w.ere sixteen and twenty years 'Of age." 
12 Utah 2d at 346. The Court further stated in Mann v. 
Fairbourn that ''such a rule of law has not been ob-
served by this Court in other cases." Ci ting Harold v. 
Smith, 56 Utah 304, 190 P. 932, 933; Kawaguchi v. Ben-
nett, 112 Utah 442, 189 P. 2d 109; Morbey v. Rogers, 122 
Utah 540, 252 P. 2d 231, and noted that the dicta of 
Arrowhead was corrected by the Court later in that 
same case when it said: 
"The question as to whether a child's capacity 
is such that it may be chargeable with contribu-
tory negligence is a question of fact for the jury, 
unless so ycung and immature as to require the 
court to judicially know that it could not contri-
bute to its own injury or be responsible for it's 
acts, or so old and mature that the court must 
know that, though an infant, yet it is responsible." 
This Court further amplified and supported re-
spondents argument that plaintiff's capacity and negli-
gence should have been decided as a rnatteir of law 
when it noted: 
''The capacity or incapacity of a ·child is a 
factual inquiry and the test to he applied is that 
applicable to any other question of fact." (Em-
phasis supplied) Id. at 346. 
By relating the question of a child's negligence t 11 
a level parallel to any other faetual determination, the 
eourt clearly defined the right of a judge to deliver a 
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summary judgment 1based upon facts about which rea-
sonable men could net differ. 
In light 1of the Mann case, supra, appellants' argu-
ment that any question involving a child'1s contributory 
negligence must be submitted to the jury is not supported 
by current Utah law, and the Carr v. Bradshaw appeal 
presents facts which justify the District Com't 's ruling 
of summary judgment. 
Jeff Carr was riding a bicycle down a public side-
He was glancing periodically at the sidewalk; he 
did not 1see the car leave its stall, start to the street, 
begin to cross the sidewalk, or come to a step, even 
though he was aware of the location of the lot and knew 
what its purpose was. When he finaB.y did look up, he 
saw the respondent's automobile stepped in the center 
of the sidewalk waiting for traffic to clear. He tried to 
apply his brakes, but he was too late and collided with 
the car. 
It appeared to the District Court that a boy nearly 
twelve yeavs old, a good student, independent and ath-
letic, at the very minimum should watch where be is 
gcing while riding a bicycle, particularly one which he 
had ridden for only six months and which possessed 
narrow tires and handlebar-operated brakes. There was 
simply no other conclusion for reasonable men to reach 
than that the plaintiff was negligent in not keeping a 
proper lookcut, in riding his bicycle too fast for existing 
conditi1011s, and riding straight into a parked car. Had 
there been a brick wall extending into the sidewalk 
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instead of the res'Pondent 's automobile, reasonable men 
could not have assumed the wall would be at fault in 
being in the sidewalk but that a boy nearly twelve years 
old has at least some duty to not run into such a wall 
by keeping a proper l•ookout. With regard to the duty of 
a bicycli·st to maintain tboth a proper lookout and reason-
able speed, the cases of Lapenteur v. Eldridge Motors, 
55 P. 2d 1064 (Washington, 1936), and Gallenz et al v. 
Griffiths, 38 Atlantic 2d 721 (Pennsylvania, 1944), seem 
particularly applica·ble. In Lapenteur, the court held that 
a bicyclist, who had been following approximately twenty 
feet behind an automobile while the driver was testing 
his brakes and who in the process of that test stopped 
the automo·bile suddenly and without warning to the 
bicyclist, wa1s contributorily negligent as a matter of law 
when he collided with the back of the stopped car. In 
reaching that decision the court commented that a motor-
ist foHowing another must govern his speed and keep 
back a reasonably safe distance so as to allow himself 
reasonable time for an emergency stop and that that 
particular rule should also apply to a bicyclist and that 
he should be required to keep •such distance from the 
automobile ahead of him and maintain such observation 
of the automobile that an emergency stop may be safely 
made, citing Ritter v. Johnson, 163 Washington 153, 300 
Pac. 518. The court concluded its decision of that case 
by commenting that the consequences of the case itself 
demonstrates "that the appellant was either not main-
taining a pro'Per lookout or else that his speed was too 
great to provide a fair margin of safety under the cir-
9 
cumstances." 300 Pac. at 1067. See also McGowan v. 
Tayman, 132 S.E. 3Hi (Yirginia, 1926). In Gallenz a 
boy of fifteen suffered personal injuries when he was 
unable to stop the bicycle he was riding in time to avoid 
colliding with defendant's parked automobile. In affirm-
ing a judgment for the defendant on the grounds that 
defendant's negligence, if any, was not a proximate 
cause of the accident and that the plaintiff was contribu-
torily negligent as a matter of law, the court noted: 
''A bicycle rider has the same duty a1s any 
ether vehicle operator-to keep it under such con-
trol that he can stop or turn it to avoid collisions. 
Mehler v. Doyle, 271 Pennsylvania 492, 115 At-
lantic 797. He cannot willfully run into a standing 
vehicle and recover damages from his resulting 
injury. Simrell v. Eschenback, 303 Pennsylvania 
156, 154 Atlantic 369. And a boy 10.f fifteen years 
of ·age is deemed to be sufficiently capable of 
appreciating the dangers incident to bicycle 
riding to ccnvict him in a proper case of contri-
butory negligence as a matter of law. Geiger v. 
Garrett, 270 Pennsylvania 192, 113 Atlantic 195; 
Miller v. City of Erie, 340 Pennsylvania 177, 16 
Atlantic 2d 37." 
See also LeFleur v. Hernandez, 191 Pac. 2d 95, 84 
Cal. App. 2d 569, in which the court imposed a duty upon 
a ten-year-old bicyclist to exercise o·rdinary care at all 
times to avoid placing himself or others in danger and 
to avoid a collision; and Johnson v. Northern Pacific 
Railway Conipany, 66 Washington 2d 614, 404 Pac. 2d 
444 (1965), where it was held that a minor on a bicycle 
is subject to the same rules of the road as a driver of a 
motor vehicle. 
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In accord with the above reasoning is Rivas v. Paci-
! ic Finance Company, 16 Utah 2d 183, 397 P. 2d 990 
(1964). The court there held that even a boy just under 
six years of age who sued for injuries suffered when 
defendant's car ran into him on his sleigh could be guilty 
of contributory negligence. In reaching that conclusion, 
the court stated: 
"We are in accord with the idea that a child 
is not expected to have the maturity of judgment 
nor the capacity to cope with danger that an adult 
would have and consequently is not held to the 
adult standard of care. Nevertheless, a child even 
of this age has some duty to care for his own 
safety, and if he fails to observe it can be guilty of 
contributory neglig·ence. The requirement is that 
he exercise that degree of care which ordinarily 
would be observed by children of the .sa.me age, 
intelligence and experience under similar circum-
stances." 
Corollary to the foregoing is the fact that when a 
child is known to be in a situation of possible danger, he 
bas a duty to observe extra caution for his own safety. 
This is a more particularized application of the usual 
standard requirement of due care under the circum-
stances, the modifying circumstance being the fact that 
a child is involved. 
In Donohue v. Rolando, 16 Utah 2d 294, 400 P. 
2d 12 (1965), the court referred to both Mann v. Fair-
bourn, supra, Rivas v. Pacific Finance Company, supra, 
and to Nelson v. Arro·whead, supra, in re-emphasizing 
the rule that a child must exercise that degree of care 
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which ordinarily would be observed by children of the 
same age, intelligence and experience under similar 
circumstances. 
In treating the application of the above standard 
an annotation at 77 ALR 2d 921 seems particularly ap-
plicable. That annotation noted that under a procedure 
involving the above test the question would be regarded 
as one of fact: whether the infant plaintiff's conduct 
met the standard to 'be expected 'Of children of like age, 
development and experience. It is further noted in that 
annotation: 
''As in other cases involving fact issues, the 
court would rule as a matter of law if it deter-
mined that reasonable men could not disagree 
upon the question .... '' Page 921. 
In applying the question of the capacity of a child 
for contributory negligence, numerous cases have recog-
nized that there may be a presumption conclusive or 
rebuttable that a child of a particular age is capa.:ble of 
having exercised s1ome care for its own safety. In Gay-
hart v. Schwabe, 180 Idaho 354, 330 P. 2d 327 (1958), 
the court held that a normal boy of thirteen has reached 
an age where a degree of responsibility for hi,s oontribu-
tory negligence is recognized. In Plauche v. Consolidated 
Cos., 235 Louisiana 692, 105 Southern 2d 269 (1958), the 
court held that a child's caution in a given case must 
be judged by his maturity and capacity to evaluate the 
circumstances in each particular case, and he must 
exercise only the care expected of his age, intelligence 
and experience. Thus, the court held a child of twelve 
12 
can clearly he guilty of contributory negligence even 
though in that particular case the boy was held free of 
such negligence. It was also noted in Gratto v. Palangi, 
154 Maryland 308, 147 Atlantic 2d 455 (1958) that a 
child of twelve knows he must share the use of the street 
with automobiles and as a swimmer must share the use 
of a great pond with boats. (For further cases treating 
this point see 77 ALR 2d 928 to 940. See also an annota-
tion at 174 ALR 1134 regarding the capacity of nine to 
thirteen year olds and an annotation at 174 ALR 1136 
for numerous cases where capacity and contributory 
negligence of minors has ·been found as a matter of law.) 
An analysis of the facts of this case should clearly 
reveal the correctness of the District Court's decision 
in light of the standard of care applied to twelve year 
old boys. The plaintiff did not see the car until he was 
too close to avoid collision because he had been riding 
with his head down "or something." (Deposition of 
Jeff L. Carr, P. 10.) The car had been stopped in the 
sidewalk in order to allow safe entry into Main Street 
traffic flow a "go·od ten seconds." (Deposition of Byron 
K. Anderson, P. 17.) Had the car and the bicycle rider 
arrived at the point of impact at the same time, a dif-
ferent questicn would be raised, but such was not the 
case. The car was across the sidewalk, the driver had 
observed no bicycle riders coming from either direction, 
and the car had been stopped a substantial period of 
time when the plaintiff drove his bicycle into the car as 
negligent as if he had driven into a stone wall. 
13 
This type of accident is not unique to this jurisdic-
tion. In Jordan v. Crowell, 171 Southern Reporter 4i7 
(Louisiana Second Circuit 1937), a case nearly identical 
with the Carr case factually, the court held the bicycle 
rider guilty of contributory negligence. In that case the 
defendant, a nineteen year old boy, was entering a 
street from his private driveway, which had a four foot 
high wall and some shrubbery much 'higher which totally 
obscured his vision, both to the left and the right. He 
had to cross a side\valk before reaching the street, which 
he knew was not only used by pedestrians but also by 
children in the neighborhood in riding their bicycles. He 
failed to honk his horn or give any warning whatsoever 
and pulled across the sidewalk and stopped. At that 
same time, an eleven year old girl was riding her bicycle 
on the sidewalk at a fairly rapid rate of speed. She was 
mature for her age and far above average in intelligence, 
and her testimony clearly demonstrated those facts. She 
\Vas in the 8th grade, had passed this driveway many 
times and knew that cars came •out of the driveway 
every day. She was fully aware that a car driver coming 
out of this driveway could not see her until he was in the 
act of cro'S•sing the sidewalk. vVith this knowledge, the 
young girl attempted to cross the driveway on the side-
walk without looking and at a very rapid rate of speed for 
a bicycle to travel. At the time of the accident she was 
"pumping" in order to gain speed and a witness ob-
served that she had her head down, which resulted in a 
lr:wer level of vision. Had she been riding at a normal 
speed with her head up, she could have seen the car in 
14 
time to avoid the accident. But the court held that she 
\\'US negligent in riding on the sidewalk, in going at an 
excessive speed at the point of danger, and in not 1ook-
ing ahead; and her negligence contributed to and was a 
proximate cause of the accident and barred her recovery. 
In Lareait v. Trader, 403 S.W. 2d 265 (Kentucky, 
1966), an action was brought for the death of a thirteen 
year old bicyclist struck by defendant '•s car. In revers-
ing a verdict given at trial for the defendants, the court 
noted that where there is se6ous doubt •of a minor's 
capability of being contributorily negligent, the issue 
should be submitted to the jury, but where an infant of 
age thirteen years eight months had been intelligent, 
had had average judgment generally for one of his age, 
had been healthy, athletic and self-sufficient, and had 
been riding a bicycle since he was 6ix years old and had 
been thoroughly familiar with the highway over which 
he was traveling, the infant as a matter of law had suffi-
cient judgment to. be held for any negligence he may 
haYe shown although the court found no contributory 
negligence in that particular case. Therefore in light of 
the above cases and based upon the facts as they are 
given in the Carr v. Bradsha,w appeal, even when viewed 
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the conclusion 
is clear and undisputed; Jeff L. Carr, a boy having the 
intelligence, experience, and judgment of children his 
(nm age, was negligent, as a matter of law in failing to 
keep a proper lookout, in traveling too fast for existing 
conditions, and in colliding with a parked automobile 
stopped in order to allow traffic to clear prior to entry 
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into the traffic flow. On those facts, the District Court 
wa.s justified in light of case law from this and other 
jurisdictions as well as general common sense in grant-
ing a summary judgment. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL OOURT DID NOT ERR IN DETER-
MINING AS A MATTER OF LAW THE NEGLI-
GENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF IN THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF'S OWN NEGLIGENCE \VAS A PROXI-
MA'TE CAUSE OF HIS INJURIEIS AND WAS AT 
LEAST A CONTRIBUTING CAUSE OF THE ACCI-
DENT. 
In bis 1second point appellant asserts that even if 
an adult standard is applied to the plaintiff, this sum-
mary judgment ·still is unjustified due to what is as-
serted to be a justifia;ble a'Ct on the part of the plaintiff 
in diverting bis attention from his lookout. 
Respondent asserts that the ·standard to he applied 
in this case has been thoroughly discussed under P10int I 
and that as to the diversion of attention by the plaintiff, 
the facts clearly illustrate that the plaintiff was riding 
his bicycle with his head down and that he had it down 
diverted from his attention to what was ahead long 
enough under the facts to 
1) fail to see the car leave its parking stall, 
2) fail to see the car start toward the Main Street, 




5) sit motionless for ten seconds prior to impact. 
Respondent doesn't wish to contend that when a boy 
nearly twelve years old is riding a bicycle over an un-
smooth sidewalk that he may not divert his attenti·on to 
the terrain momentarily, but conversely the court can 
see from the facts that the failure in this case to keep a 
proper lookout was not momentary. It was long enough 
to allow all of the above events to occur and to ultimately 
cause plaintiff's injuries. 
Plaintiff '•s own case of Hindmarsh v. 0. P. Skaggs 
Foodliner, 121 Utah 2d 413, 446 P. 2d 410 (1968), makes 
it clear that 
'' . . . Where there is a danger plainly to be 
seen, and the plaintiff fails to avoid it, it is ordin-
ruled that she wa1s negligent either in failing 
to look ·Or in failing to heed .... '' 446 P. 2d at 412. 
Thus, ·on the morning of the accident a bicycle rider 
wasn't looking where he was going, be was traveling 
''fast,'' was riding a complicated piece of machinery, he 
did not keep an adequate or proper lookout, and be ran 
into a car which had been sitting across the sidewalk at 
rest for a considerable period of time. 
Respondent, therefore, submits that the court did 
not commit error in granting defendant's motion fior 
summary judgment in thi1s case in that the conduct of 
the child in failing to see and driving his bicycle into 
the side of a parked automobile was the sole proximate 
cause of his injuries; and the parking of the automobile 
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1on the sidewalk, even though we consider this to be 
illegal and therefore negligent, was only a condition 
which had to exist for the accident to happen in the same 
manner as the wall to which we previously referred to 
in an example had to be there in order for the child to 
run into it. Further, that although children are not gen-
erally held to the same standards as adults in regards to 
negligent activities and the question of their caparity 
may generally be a jury question, the same test is appli-
cable in light of case law of this jurisdiction and other 
persuasive jurisdictions to the question before this court 
as is applicable to other qiwstions of fact. 
It would appear to us that a jury cf fair minded 
men could not reasonably find otherwise than that an 
elev-en year old boy who drives his bicycle down a side-
walk and directly into a visible object in front of him is 
guilty of contributory negligence. 
CONCLUSION 
In deciding this case and in arguing the points Lr 
the facts must be looked at in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff. In looking at those facts, as 
they exist from the depositions and testimony of those 
involved in the accident, only one conclusion arises . 
.Jeff L. Carr on a elear day ran into a car through 
f1e negligence of no one hut himself and the injuries l1e 
re::eived were a proximate result of that negligence and 
were at least a contributing factor to his injuries. 
Therefore the trial court was correct in its finding 
' 
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that "·ith regard to the facts of thi,s case, even when 
Yiewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, reasQn-
ahle men could not differ as to their conclusions and 
defendant was entitled to a summary judgment, as a 
matter of law. 
Respondent respectfully requests that the deter-
mination of the Fifth Judicial District Court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
By Don J. Hans-on 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Def endants-Respond'ents 
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